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Transnationalizing Multiple Secularities:  
A Comparative Study of the  
Global Isma ՙili Community 
Mohammad Magout ∗ 
Abstract: »Transnationalisierung von Multiple Secularities: eine komparative 
Studie der globalen ismaʿilitischen Gemeinschaft«. This article starts with and 
proceeds from empirical observations about the ways international Ismaՙili stu-
dents at two institutes for Islamic studies in London draw boundaries between 
religion and other spheres in their everyday life. According to these observa-
tions, students from Ismaՙili communities in Iran, Tajikistan, and Syria tend to 
make more explicit distinctions between a religious domain and a secular one 
in comparison with their Khoja coreligionists of East African descent. In order 
to explain this disparity, structural, ideological, and social conditions in their 
respective countries and communities are analyzed using the framework of 
multiple secularities. It is argued that while Ismaՙili communities in Iran, Tajiki-
stan, and Syria have each internalized a motif of secularity from its broader na-
tional context, Khoja Ismaՙili communities have developed their own form of 
secularity, which can be described in terms of internal secularization. This arti-
cle makes a contribution to the multiple secularities framework by extending 
its application to the transnational domain and to the analysis of secularity 
within religious communities. Furthermore, the article offers a comparative ap-
proach to the study the role of religion in global Ismaՙilism. 
Keywords: Secularity, internal secularization, Isma’ilism, transnational religious 
movements, Khoja, East Africa, Aga Khan III. 
1. Introduction: The Study of Secularization in 
Contemporary Ismaՙilism 
The contemporary Nizari Isma ՙili community, which belongs to the Shiʻi branch 
of Islam, consists of around two to three million Isma ՙilis1 who are distributed 
over more than 25 countries in five different continents. Depending on geo-
                                                             
∗  Mohammad Magout, Kolleg-Forschergruppe “Multiple Secularities - Beyond the West, Beyond 
Modernities”, Nikolaistraße 8-10, 04109 Leipzig, Germany; m.magout@uni-leipzig.de. 
1  Due to the absence of reliable statistical data, the numbers of Isma’ilis mentioned in this 
article, whether worldwide or in individual countries, are only estimates. 
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graphic region, language, and ethnicity, Nizari Ismaՙilis can be classified into 
the following groups: Arabic-speaking Ismaՙilis in Syria; Persian-speaking 
Ismaՙilis in Iran and Afghanistan; Central Asian Ismaՙilis, who are divided 
among Tajikistan, northern parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the Xinjiang 
region in China; and South Asian Ismaՙilis, the majority of whom are known as 
the Khoja, who descend from the Sindh-Gujarat area in modern day Pakistan 
and India. The latter group has established, over the course of the 19th and 20th 
centuries, diasporic communities in East Africa, Southeast Asia, and later in 
Western Europe and North America. These communities are connected to each 
other through a transnational network of institutions that provide a variety of 
religious and social services to their members. Khoja Isma ՙili communities are 
generally well integrated into this institutional framework and they constitute 
its financial and administrative base, whereas other communities vary in the 
level of their integration and participation in global Ismaՙilism.2  
Khoja Nizari Isma ՙili communities in East African countries attracted con-
siderable scholarly attention in the 1960s and 1970s at the heyday of moderni-
zation theories. Many authors saw in them an interesting, if not paradoxical, 
case of a religious (Muslim) community that has a very modern outlook yet 
continues to hold to its religious traditions and the authority of its spiritual 
leaders: the Aga Khans.3 On the one hand, Khoja Isma ՙili communities are 
entrepreneurial, Western-oriented, and highly educated, with women having 
fairly good access to education, work, and leadership positions. On the other 
hand, religion apparently continues to be a central aspect for Khoja Ismaՙilis, 
with much of individual and social life centered on religious rituals and institu-
tions. What made their case paradoxical – a term that one frequently encoun-
ters in studies about Isma ՙilis in general and Khoja in particular4 – is that their 
modernity seemed to stem from a theological principle that may be perceived 
as irrational and anti-modern (in the Weberian sense); namely, unquestionable 
submission to the authority of a person who is believed to be infallible and 
divinely guided: the Ismaՙili Imam. Authors of these studies have reasoned that 
the latest two Aga Khans happened to be open to the West and modernity, and 
                                                             
2  For an overview of contemporary Ismaili communities, see Daftary (2011). For a study of the 
interaction between transnational Isma’ili institutions and local communities (in this case in 
Central Asia), see Steinberg (2011). 
3  The Aga Khan is a hereditary title that has been held by Nizari Isma’ili Imams since the 
Imamate of Hasan ʻAli Shah (r. 1817-1881). After the brief four-year Imamate of his son 
Aqa ʻAli Shah (Aga Khan II), Nizari Isma’ilis have been led ever since by two Imams only: Aga 
Khan III (r. 1885-1957), who took office at the age of eight, and his successor and grandson 
the current Aga Khan (or Aga Khan IV), who has already been an Imam for more than 60 
years.  
4  See for example, Morris (1958, 471-472); Anderson (1964, 22-3); Gellner (1973, 196); 
Keshavjee (1981, ch. III, 21); and Ruthven (1997, 382-4).  
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so they used their divine authority to implement extensive reforms institutional-
ly and doctrinally to modernize the community smoothly and quickly.  
This seemingly paradoxical nature of modernization in the case of Khoja 
Ismaՙilis extends to the question of secularization. Are Khoja Isma ՙilis highly 
secularized, as it may seem from their organizational structures, worldly orien-
tation, and openness toward Western culture, or not, as the continuous centrali-
ty of religion in their daily life indicates? Or is the question itself irrelevant in 
their case since for them any distinction between the religious and the secular 
makes little sense, except perhaps when it comes to politics? If ‘secularization’ 
was initiated by religious authority itself, is it still meaningful to call it secular-
ization? How do issues of secularization and modernization for Khoja Isma ՙilis 
differ from those for other Ismaՙili communities which are found in widely 
different contexts and are less integrated into the transnational, institutional, 
and ideological framework created by the Aga Khans? As Isma ՙili communities 
have become increasingly connected with each other in recent years, how are 
different perceptions of the definition and role of religion in the global Isma ՙili 
community arising in their social interactions?  
Answering these questions requires a theoretical approach that takes into ac-
count different dimensions and constellations of the relationship between the 
religious and the secular, which will be implemented in this article using the 
framework of multiple secularities introduced by Monika Wohlrab-Sahr and 
Marian Burchardt (2012; also in the introduction of this special issue, Dressler, 
Salvatore, and Wohlrab-Sahr 2019) together with the concept of internal secu-
larization, which was first coined by Thomas Luckmann (1967). Furthermore, 
a comparative analysis of notions of secularity in different Isma ՙili communities 
is undertaken. The comparison begins with empirical observations taken from 
field research into social interaction between Isma ՙilis from different countries 
on a transnational level (in this case, international students at two postgraduate 
institutions for Islamic studies in London, which belong to the Ismaՙili commu-
nity). The analysis of these empirical data in a previous study (Magout 2016, 
145-69) has shown that Isma ՙilis from countries such as Iran, Tajikistan, and 
Syria tend to make clear distinctions between a domain that is religious and 
another that is secular compared with Khoja Isma ՙilis, for whom there seems to 
be a confluence between the religious and the secular in most spheres. In order 
to provide an explanation of this empirical disparity and provide an analytical 
picture of the multiple secularities of global Ismaՙilism, the structural, political, 
and social conditions in their respective home countries and communities are 
analyzed using the framework of multiple secularities and the concept of inter-
nal secularization. The focus in this article will be on the Imamate of Aga Khan 
III (r. 1885-1957), who laid the institutional and ideological foundations that 
still shape Ismaՙilism in the 21st century.  
Through this comparative analysis, the article makes a number of theoretical 
and empirical contributions to the study of secularity, transnational religious 
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movements, and contemporary Nizari Isma ՙilism. First, it deals with the ques-
tion of multiple secularities at multiple levels: from the micro-level of individ-
ual perceptions and practices, through the meso-level of religious communities, 
up to the national and transnational levels. It does so by combining the frame-
work of multiple secularities with the concept of internal secularization to show 
that motifs of secularity that arise within religious communities may not be 
related only to notions of secularity within wider society, but also to internal 
dynamics within each community and its institutional and cultural links beyond 
the boundaries of the nation state. Contemporary Isma ՙili communities, as the 
analysis below shall demonstrate, present illustrative examples of both nation-
ally bound and transnationally framed notions of secularity and of tensions and 
dynamics that may result from their interface. Finally, given the lack of com-
parative studies about contemporary Ismaՙili communities5, this article could be 
the starting point for an academic discussion that examines their differences 
and similarities across the globe. 
2. Empirical Observations: Drawing Boundaries between 
the Religious and the Secular in Everyday Life 
In 2013 and 2014, I conducted fieldwork on Ismaՙili postgraduate students at 
the Institute of Ismaili Studies (IIS) and Aga Khan University’s Institute for the 
Study of Muslim Civilisations (ISMC) in London for my PhD dissertation 
(Magout 2016). The fieldwork consisted of in-depth, open-ended interviews 
about their life in London and in their home countries in addition to participant 
observation conducted at the two institutes, the accommodation of the students, 
and Isma ՙili community centers in London. The Isma ՙili community in London 
consists primarily of Khojas originating from East African countries that were 
under British colonial rule (Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania), but later it received 
further immigrants from South Asia and more recently from Afghanistan, Iran, 
Tajikistan, and Syria. Yet the community still retains its dominant Khoja East 
African character demographically and liturgically. 
Data collected from my fieldwork in London indicates that there are system-
atic differences between how Ismaՙilis from different communities demarcate 
the boundaries of religion and determine its relationship with other spheres. For 
Khoja Isma ՙilis, religion seemed to interweave with most aspects of their indi-
vidual and social life, and they made little effort to distinguish between a do-
                                                             
5  Contemporary Ismaili studies thus far have only examined individual communities or inter-
action between a local community and transnational Ismaili institutions. To take a number 
of Ismaili communities from different regions and traditions together and examine a certain 
social, cultural, or economic aspect from a comparative angle has – to the best of my 
knowledge – not yet been undertaken. 
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main that is explicitly religious and another that is not. In comparison, Ismaՙilis 
from Syria, Iran, and Tajikistan tended to make more clear-cut distinctions 
between religion and non-religion, defining religion as a clearly demarcated 
domain of their individual and social life. A good place to observe such differ-
ences between Khoja and non-Khoja Isma ՙilis are jamatkhanas6 in London. 
Differences and contrasts in terms of behavior are obvious to the eye of the 
observer. Khoja Isma ՙilis tend to deal with these gatherings as religious as well 
as social events where one participates in congregational prayers but also 
spends some time afterwards socializing with fellow Ismaՙilis. This is also re-
flected in their clothing, which is meant, especially among women, to reflect 
social status.7 Non-Khoja Isma ՙilis, on the other hand, express discomfort at 
what they perceive as an amalgamation of social and religious aspects, as the 
following quotation from an interview with a female student from Tajikistan 
indicates:  
In the namaz that we did in Tajikistan, we used to go there without any 
makeup, with closed hairs, and very humble and simple clothes. I don’t know; 
I felt like it was some kind of initiation into prayer itself. But here I felt like 
you’re preparing yourself for a social event rather than going to pray. I think 
it’s, as we studied, the sacred part and the profane... I think the profane part is 
bigger than the sacred (laugh) Yeah, I got these impressions. So for myself, if 
I wear like my posh clothes, and I do my hairs and stuff, I really don’t think 
about God (laugh) I don’t know. I would not think, like for me personally, I 
would be like more social talking and doing something. Of course, I know that 
it’s one part of the functions of jamatkhana here, because they don’t have any 
other opportunity to meet. I understand it, but it’s still like... this is the part I 
don’t feel much comfort in jamatkhana.8 
The above quote shows that for this Tajik student, namaz (ritual prayer) entails 
a clear spatial and temporal demarcation from the mundane part of the world. 
Hence moving from the mundane into the sacred side involves crossing bound-
aries, which requires some kind of “initiation,” such as wearing simple clothes 
and covered hair. For her, wearing elaborate clothes and make-up belongs to 
the “social” or the “profane” domain, and so they should be left there as soon 
                                                             
6  Jamatkhana is an Anglicization of the Arabic-Persian term jamaʻatkhana (meaning “place of 
gathering” or “congregational hall”) used by Khoja Isma ՙilis to refer to their community cen-
ters, which serve both religious and non-religious functions. The concept of jamatkhana can 
be traced to the idea of “caste-hall” in South Asia (Akhtar 2016, 90) and it has only recently 
been introduced into other Isma ՙili communities. Isma ՙilis from Syria, for example, still call 
their place of worship masjid (mosque), and it is almost exclusively for religious purposes. 
7  Khoja men are usually dressed in business suits, whereas many women come to jamatkhana 
in elaborate traditional South Asian dresses (such as saris) and jewelry. Non-Khoja Isma ՙilis, 
on the other hand, tend to show up in more casual clothing.  
8  Interview with an IIS student, 01 March 2013. The transcript has been minimally edited to 
improve grammar and readability. All Interviews cited in this article were conducted confi-
dentially in London.  
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as one steps into the “sacred” sphere of jamatkhana. Taking them into jamat-
khana is a transgression of the boundaries of the sacred that prevents one from 
“[thinking] about God.” The cited student does realize that for Khoja Isma ՙilis, 
jamatkhanas have social “functions,” but she still feels uncomfortable mixing 
the two.9 Interestingly, this custom of women showing up elaborately dressed 
in jamatkhana10 was also criticized by two other Khoja female interviewees, 
but from a socio-economic, non-religious perspective.11 For them, there is 
apparently no problem with jamatkhanas functioning as spaces for social inter-
action, but, as maintained by one of them, this custom generates excessive 
social pressure to live up to high expectations in terms of expenditure on cloth-
ing.12 As a result, some less well-to-do families are refraining from attending 
important religious ceremonies because they cannot afford to buy new clothes 
every time. Thus, for Khoja Isma ՙilis, the jamatkhana is not merely a religious 
space, and there is no clear-cut separation between its religious and social 
functions. As noted by Peter B. Clarke in his study of the Ismaՙili community in 
London, the jamatkhana creates a “spatio-temporal frame” that provides a 
seamless continuity between the social and the religious worlds (1976, 488).  
Curiously, when examining behavior outside jamatkhanas, the picture is re-
versed; that is, it is Khoja Ismaՙilis who tend to judge the behavior of others in 
reference to religion. In other words, for Khoja Ismaՙilis religion seems more 
relevant as a normative framework for behavior outside jamatkhanas than it is 
for students from Syria, Tajikistan, and Iran. The latter group tends to go less 
frequently and spends less time in jamatkhanas, leaving shortly after perform-
ing prayers. They generally prefer to socialize more outside the confines of the 
Ismaՙili community, and religion seems to be less relevant as a point of refer-
ence in their behavior there, compared with Khoja Isma ՙilis. This can be seen in 
moral judgements on personal behavior or even in small details such as every-
day greetings. An ISMC student from Syria, for example, cited one incident in 
which a Khoja woman from the Isma ՙili community in London reproached him 
for greeting her with “good morning” instead of ya ʻAli madad13 at the premis-
                                                             
9  Similar comments about the social aspect of jamatkhanas and how it contradicts their idea 
of a religious space were made by a male interviewee from Syria (interview with an IIS stu-
dent, 10 April 2013). For more examples and quotations from interviewed students, see Ma-
gout (2016, 145-69). 
10  According to Kassam-Remtulla, Friday evenings in Isma ՙili jamatkhanas in East Africa are 
perceived by other Asians communities, such as Hindus and Bohras, as some kind of “fashion 
shows” (2000, 70). 
11  Interview with an IIS student, 14 April 2013; interview with an ISMC student, 26 April 2013. 
12  Interview with an ISMC student, 26 April 2013. 
13  The phrase ya ʻAli madad is an invocation for aid (madad in Arabic and Persian) from ʻAli 
that is common among Shiʻis and Sufis in Iran and South Asia. It is used by Khoja Ismaՙilis as 
an everyday greeting (an Ismaՙili equivalent to the common Islamic greeting of al-salam 
ʻalaykum). For most other Ismaՙili communities, however, ya ʻAli madad is reserved primarily 
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es of his institute, reasoning that she is an “Ismaՙili,” not an “English” woman. 
He also criticized another Khoja fellow student for serving food brought from 
jamatkhana (nandi)14 only to Ismaՙilis. For this Syrian student, public spaces, 
such as the ISMC, are neutral places where social interaction occurs within a 
secular or non-religious framework of behavior, whereas for his Khoja coreli-
gionists, religion continues to be a relevant framework for everyday interac-
tions outside jamatkhanas, whether with Ismaՙilis or non-Ismaՙilis.  
It should be stressed here that the above observations do not mean that 
members of one group are inclined to be more religious than members of the 
other, although they do sometimes make such normative judgments about one 
another. What is at issue here is not religiosity – as a normative comparative 
category of individuals (“more” vs. “less” religious individuals) – but differen-
tiation between distinct social spheres in relation or in reference to religion 
(religious vs. social/cultural/political, sacred vs. profane, worldly vs. non-
worldly, etc.). As the above examples indicate, non-Khoja Ismaՙilis are more 
careful to distinguish between spaces, time intervals, and forms of behavior 
that they consider specifically religious or for which they consider religion is a 
relevant framework, and those that are specifically secular or for which religion 
is not relevant. The Khoja, on the other hand, are observably less inclined to 
define a domain that is purely religious and another that is purely secular. To 
put it in simple terms for the sake of clarification: one group (that is, Isma ՙilis 
from Syria, Tajikistan, and Iran) is disposed to see religion and the secular 
more in terms of black and white – one domain is strictly religious (rituals, 
beliefs) and the other is strictly secular (e.g., social life, cultural identity) – 
while for the other group (that is, the Khoja), religion and the secular tend to 
merge into different shades of grey. This does not mean, however, that the 
religious-secular distinction is irrelevant for the Khoja. For example, when it 
comes to politics and the government, many Khoja would recognize a secular 
domain that is separate from religion. These observations pertain primarily to 
the social sphere, and they are comparative in nature; i.e., comparing Isma ՙili 
communities relative to each other rather than making statements about them in 
absolute terms.  
Now, how does one explain these different patterns of distinguishing be-
tween religion and the secular among students from different Ismaՙili communi-
ties in London? The fact that these patterns of behavior and perceptions have 
emerged frequently and systematically in empirical data (not only my own, but 
                                                                                                                                
for religious contexts; for example, to call attention during a religious gathering or to greet 
someone who has just finished performing ritual prayers.  
14  Isma ՙilis bring food offerings (nandi) to jamatkhanas, where they are auctioned after ritual 
prayers.  
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also that of other researchers15) suggests that there might be reasons that lie 
beyond individual biographies; in social, cultural, and communal characteris-
tics of these communities.  
3. Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Secularization as a Multi-Dimensional Process 
It has long been recognized among sociologists of religion that secularization 
does not simply represent a net reduction in religious beliefs and practices or 
the scope of religion in the public sphere but new configurations of the reli-
gious and the secular and new modes of structuring the relationship between 
the two. Furthermore, sociologists of religion distinguish between several lev-
els, dimensions, or sub-processes of secularization. José Casanova (2006, 7-8), 
for example, speaks of functional differentiation, privatization, and religious 
decline, while Karel Dobbelaere (1987) and Mark Chaves (1993; 1994) refer to 
micro- (individual), meso- (organizational, communal), and macro- (societal) 
levels. The point of contestation in all of these perspectives is the exact rela-
tionship between these different dimensions, levels, or sub-processes. For the 
purposes of this article, we are primarily concerned with how individual cogni-
tive and normative categories regarding religion are related to structural, politi-
cal, and legal arrangements that govern religion and its relationship with other 
spheres in different social contexts. In the words of Peter L. Berger, we are 
concerned with how the “institutional ‘location’ of religion in contemporary 
society” is related to its “location in consciousness” (1967, 147-52).  
Needless to say, the relationship between these two dimensions is complex. 
Living in a society where religion has been removed from public life does not 
automatically lead individuals in this society to internalize the notion that reli-
gion belongs to the private sphere (i.e., the “location” of religion in conscious-
ness is not merely a function of its “location” in society). Conversely, individu-
al conceptions of religion are not independent of structural arrangements in 
society. There are a variety of factors that may influence individual perceptions 
of religion as a category vis-à-vis others, such as socio-economic position, 
education, political and ideological orientation, social milieu, and so forth. 
Another important factor in this regard is the nature of the religion or the reli-
                                                             
15  My observations here intersect with those made by Laila Kadiwal, who also dealt in her PhD 
dissertation with Isma ՙili students in London. She notes that faith for Khoja students tends 
to be “congregational” as opposed to their Tajik counterparts, for whom it is rather “private” 
(2015, 122). Clarke also notes that it is “well nigh impossible for an Ismaili [Khoja] to make a 
meaningful distinction between the religious and the social, the spiritual and the material 
role of the Jamat” (1976, 488).  
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gious community in question. One may observe that members of different 
religious communities within the same society develop different subjectivities 
of secularity, and hence there is a need to look at the meso-level as well as the 
macro-level to study the factors influencing the subjective location of religion. 
In this regard, transnational connections of a religious community might be, as 
in the case of Isma ՙilis, a significant factor in shaping their notions of secularity. 
In order for the analysis to take into consideration these multiple dimensions 
and levels, two complementary theoretical frameworks are implemented in this 
article: multiple secularities and internal secularization. 
3.2 Multiple Secularities 
Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt define secularity as “institutionally as well as 
culturally and symbolically anchored forms and arrangements of differentiation 
between religion and other social spheres and practices” (2012, 881). The con-
cept of multiple secularities is based on the recognition that distinctions be-
tween religion and other societal spheres, whether latent or explicit, are 
“charged with highly divergent meanings and linked to different political and 
cultural contexts and histories of social conflict.” Accordingly, one may speak 
of cultures of secularity; i.e., certain dispositions and tendencies to draw, main-
tain, and negotiate the boundaries between religion and other social domains in 
different contexts and groups (ibid., 904-5). Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt pro-
pose four “ideal-types” of “motifs of secularity,” which they formulate in terms 
of “secularity for the sake of...”: 1) individual liberties, 2) balanc-
ing/accommodating diversity, 3) social integration/national development, and 
4) the independent development of institutional domains. For each type, Wohl-
rab-Sahr and Burchardt identify “guiding ideas” that serve to “set the basic 
terms for distinguishing religious and secular spaces in a given society” (ibid., 
888). These motifs are not to be taken as boxes to which secularities in differ-
ent countries would be allocated. There could be in any given country at any 
given period of time more than one motif of secularity competing or coexisting 
with each other, but it might also be that one motif becomes dominant over the 
other.  
What concern us here are types 2 and 3: secularity for the sake of balanc-
ing/accommodating diversity and secularity for the sake of social integra-
tion/national development. For type 3, Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt (2012, 
900-2) give Republican France, Kemalist Turkey, and former East Germany as 
paradigmatic examples, where a republican, statist, or communist ethos has 
respectively informed forms and arrangements of differentiation between the 
religious and the secular. In this type, secularity is guided by ideas of progress, 
enlightenment, and modernity, which are employed to separate the state from 
clerical and religious influence. Additionally, religious symbols and expres-
sions are restricted in the public sphere, which becomes a secular domain that 
HSR 44 (2019) 3  │  159 
is intended to unify members of the nation regardless of their religious affilia-
tion. Religion, as a result, becomes limited to the private sphere and a few 
clearly demarcated social spaces (such as places of worship).  
In the second type of secularity, balancing/accommodating diversity, which 
is guided by ideas of toleration, respect, and non-interference, the state aims at 
ensuring balance between different religious communities in order to maintain 
peace and public order. Here the state is not primarily concerned with protect-
ing individual rights (such as freedom of worship or belief) nor with the crea-
tion of a secular public sphere that serves to integrate different individuals and 
communities within a national political body. Rather, it is more concerned with 
giving religious communities, especially minorities, autonomy to manage their 
own affairs without the interference of the state or the religious majority. This 
motif of secularity, according to Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt, has become 
dominant in India in the past few decades. One of its major manifestations is 
the existence of different civil codes for religious communities, even though 
the Indian Constitution contains a provision that prescribes a uniform civil code 
in the country (Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 2012, 896-900). 
It should be noted here that the framework of multiple secularities has so far 
been applied on national/societal (macro-) levels; hence, its relevance for the 
meso- and micro-levels remains largely unexplored. While in some cases – as 
the example below of Isma ՙili communities in Iran, Tajikistan, and Syria shall 
show – religious groups may internalize a motif of secularity existing in their 
larger society, this cannot be taken for granted in all cases, as the example of 
Khoja Isma ՙili communities in East Africa will indicate. In other words, one 
cannot readily reduce secularity within a religious community (meso-level) to 
secularity in its national context (the macro-level). There is a need therefore 
within the framework of multiple secularities to expand the discussion deeper 
into the meso-level, for which purpose one might need to employ additional 
conceptual tools depending on the case. In this article, the concept of internal 
secularization serves to supplement the framework of multiple secularities in 
the analysis of secularity within Khoja Ismaՙili communities. 
3.3 Internal Secularization 
The term internal secularization was first coined by Thomas Luckmann in his 
book The Invisible Religion to describe the transformations whereby American 
church religion adapted itself to the values, needs, and organizational forms of 
industrial society in order to maintain a broad middle-class distribution (1967, 
34-7). Its European counterpart, in contrast, kept its traditional forms, thereby 
limiting its social base to the peasantry and the remnants of traditional and 
petite bourgeoisie at the margins of modern society. On an institutional level, 
internal secularization involves “bureaucratization along rational business-like 
lines”, according to Luckmann (1967, 35). In terms of ideology, it entails the 
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internalization of what Luckmann calls “the secular version of the Protestant 
ethos” (i.e., the “American Dream”) while traditional theology and doctrines 
are relegated to the background (1967, 36-7, emphasis in original).  
Peter L. Berger did not use the term internal secularization in his book The 
Sacred Canopy (1967), which, like Luckmann’s The Invisible Religion, was 
published a year after the publication of their ground-breaking work The Social 
Construction of Reality. However, he describes the transformation of American 
church religion in similar terms to Luckmann’s. Berger maintains that the pres-
sure to conform to the preferences of consumers in the competitive, free Amer-
ican religious market has produced similar institutional and ideological devel-
opments across American denominations. These developments include 
bureaucratization, replacement of clergy with lay staff, decline of theological 
and supernatural legitimations, and the standardization of services offered by 
religious institutions, which have become more material or this-worldly than 
other-worldly or spiritual (Berger 1967, 139-47). The concept of internal secu-
larization was later applied by Karel Dobbelaere (1987, 128-30), who argues 
that the “Catholic pillar” in Belgium adapted itself to the secularization of 
Belgian society by undergoing internal secularization, which he describes in 
terms similar to those of Luckmann and Berger.  
Mark Chaves used the same concept in his study of the development of the 
organizational structure of American Protestant denominations over the 20th 
century, but rather than speaking of adaptation, as previous sociologists did, he 
explains internal secularization as the outcome of competition for resources 
within religious communities (1993). He maintains that denominations are 
organizationally “dual structures” consisting of a religious authority structure 
(clerical, controlling access to religious products) and an agency structure (lay, 
administrative), which are competing over organizational resources. He subse-
quently analyzes internal secularization as the outcome of conflicts between the 
elites of these two parallel structures, concluding that there has been a con-
sistent trend in American denominations toward choosing their CEOs from 
outside the religious authority structure. Chaves characterizes this power shift 
in American denominations toward the agency structure as internal seculariza-
tion. It should be asserted that the functional approach of Luckmann, Berger, 
and Dobbelaere to internal secularization as an adaptive strategy is not incom-
patible with the approach advocated by Chaves, which focuses on internal 
power dynamics. These two aspects may indeed be mutually reinforcing; the 
nature of American society probably favors a power shift toward the bureau-
cratic agency structure, while the dominance of bureaucracy within religious 
denominations can lead to greater pragmatism in dealing with its social envi-
ronment. 
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4. Cultures of Secularity in Iran, Tajikistan, and Syria 
The Iranian modern nation state was established by Reza Shah Pahlavi (r. 
1925-1941), whose modernization efforts followed the Kemalist-statist model 
(Abrahamian 2008, 72-91), including its assertive secularism.16 Modernization 
continued during the reign of his successor Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (r. 1941-
1979), during which mass political movements such as the socialist Tudeh 
Party and the National Front of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossaddeq (r. 
1952-1953) contributed to the creation of a nation-wide political sphere. De-
spite the radical ideological break with the Pahlavi past brought about by the 
Islamic Revolution, the Islamic Republic, in the words of Ira Lapidus, “remains 
a national state in terms of its institutional bureaucratic structure and the kinds 
of economic and political policies it pursues” (1992, 20). Even in ideological 
terms, its efforts to Islamize society have not necessarily produced a population 
that is more religious than in the past. In fact, as argued by Khosrokhavar, the 
secularization “from above” under the Shahs, which centered around moderni-
zation and nation-state building, was followed by a second process of seculari-
zation “from below” under the Islamic Republic, which centered around indi-
vidual rights and liberties. This second process of secularization has mainly 
affected the younger generations in large cities and manifested itself in a num-
ber of key events in the past two decades, such as the election of reformist 
President Muhammad Khatami in 1997 and the protests of the Green Move-
ment in 2009 (Khosrokhavar 2013, 122-3). The Ismaՙili community in Iran, 
which numbers about 20,000 individuals, is ethnolinguistically Persian like the 
majority of the country. It largely hails from its state-dependent middle class 
and its members, like many middle-class Iranians, identify with Iranian nation-
alism and maintain a secular life-style and political orientation, which is further 
strengthened by their experience as a religious minority living under an Islam-
ist regime. 
The majority of Isma ՙilis in Tajikistan live in the Gorno-Badakhshan Auton-
omous Oblast (GBAO), which makes up around 45% of the area of the coun-
try, but less than 5% of its population. Unlike their coreligionists in Syria and 
Iran, Tajik Ismaՙilis constitute an ethnolinguistic group (Pamiris) that is distinct 
from the rest of the country.17 Modern state institutions in Tajikistan were 
established by the Soviets in the 1920s, when they initiated a massive project of 
social engineering to transform the region economically, culturally, and social-
                                                             
16  For the distinction between assertive and passive secularism, see Kuru (2007). 
17  Isma ՙilis in Tajikistan speak a variety of Eastern Iranian languages and identify ethnically as 
Pamiri (a Soviet ethno-linguistic neologism) as opposed to Tajik, which refers to the Sunni 
majority in the country and their language (a Western Iranian language that is closely relat-
ed to Persian). 
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ly. Under Joseph Stalin, particularly in the 1930s, the Soviets implemented a 
policy of violent repression of religion and extensive russification in Tajikistan. 
Among Isma ՙilis, religious books were confiscated, senior religious leaders 
were killed or exiled, and contact with the Aga Khan was forbidden. Eventual-
ly, Ismaՙilis were successfully integrated into the Soviet project of social engi-
neering and ideological transformation, and they became an active part of the 
cultural intelligentsia of the Soviet Republic of Tajikistan and its middle and 
working classes (Bliss 2006, 293). By the 1980s, most Isma ՙilis of Tajikistan 
identified as Pamiris, which had few religious connotations before the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. However, the fall of the Soviet Union and the ensuing 
civil war (1992-1997) undoubtedly changed the situation of Tajik Ismaՙilis 
drastically. The state institutions collapsed, which led to the Aga Khan Devel-
opment Network (AKDN)18 intervening to fill the gap, becoming thereby the 
major employer and provider of social and economic services in GBAO. Yet it 
cannot be said that Soviet secularization has been reversed, and Ismaՙilis remain 
secular in their political and social life, which can still be seen today in their 
liberal lifestyle, identification with the Soviet era, and cultural affinity with 
Russia (Steinberg 2011, 141).  
The modernization of Syrian society and the establishment of modern state 
institutions go back to the reforms implemented by the Ottoman Empire in the 
second half of the 19th century. Salamiyya, the town where the majority of 
Syrian Ismaՙilis19 reside, was placed under direct Ottoman administration in 
1894 (Amin 1983, 227-8). The expansion of the state accelerated under French 
rule (1920-1946) and after independence. In the 1950s, the main economic 
activity of Syrian Isma ՙilis shifted from agriculture to public service, especially 
in the educational and military sectors, and many middle and working class 
Ismaՙilis became actively involved in secular nationalist and socialist parties. 
The few writings about Syrian Isma ՙilis from that period (Lewis 1952; Ghalib 
1965) indicate that they became highly secularized, a development which has 
continued until recent times, as noted by Douwes, who describes Isma ՙilis as 
“among the most ‘secularized’ communities” in the region (2011, 19, 36). After 
al-Baʻth’s coup of 1963, secularization intensified but Hafiz al-Assad, who 
became President after another coup in 1970, began to appease Islamic currents 
in order to strengthen his hold on power (Al-Azmeh 2008, 293). With the de-
cline of the state’s socialist economy starting in the 1980s and the turn to eco-
nomic liberalization under Bashar al-Assad (2001-present), the regime relaxed 
                                                             
18  AKDN is an extensive network of institutions that work in social, economic, and cultural 
development in various parts of the Muslim world. It belongs to the Ismaՙili community and 
many of its projects take place in countries where Ismaՙilis live, but its services are not re-
stricted to Ismaՙilis.  
19  Isma ՙilis made up approximately 1% of Syria’s 22-million population before the outbreak of 
the ongoing civil war.  
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restrictions on religious organizations (Pierret and Selvik 2009). Consequently, 
AKDN entered Syria for the first time in 2001 and started delivering economic 
and social services to Isma ՙilis and other Syrians. These factors have doubtless 
contributed to the increasing visibility of religion and its relevance in everyday 
life, but there are no indications of a complete reversal of secularization in the 
case of Syrian Ismaՙilis.  
In general, all of the three countries mentioned above followed a modernist 
model of nation-state building, whereby a centralized state was established and 
extended deep into society to exercise direct control over most of its political, 
economic, social, and cultural spheres. The state utilized means and measures 
such as military conscription, a national educational system, mass media, a 
massive public sector, and centralized economic planning to integrate individu-
als and communities into a uniform national culture. Furthermore, mass politi-
cal movements, whether directed by the state or oppositional forces, helped 
create national political and social consciousness across a wide spectrum of the 
population. These measures involved exercising control over religious institu-
tions and religious expressions in the public sphere, even though a specific 
form of religion may have been utilized by the regime to enhance its legitima-
cy. These transformations extended beyond the structural and ideological level 
to the epistemic and subjective levels. In other words, it was not only the 
boundaries of religion in the objective, external world that changed, but also 
how individuals perceived and defined religion itself on normative and concep-
tual levels. Religious institutions for different religious communities adapted to 
this situation by limiting its sphere of activity and claims to the domain of 
worship and belief. Accordingly, the motif of secularity that became dominant 
in these countries can be classified under the societal/national integration and 
development type of Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt’s secularity framework.  
It should be stressed here that these transformations at the individual and 
communal levels may not have affected the whole population equally; and even 
if for a time they had, conditions have changed in the past few decades (in Iran 
after the Islamic Revolution in 1979; in Tajikistan after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991; and in Syria starting from the 1980s). In all of these 
countries, religion has recently become more relevant in the political, econom-
ic, and individual spheres. However, I would argue here that Ismaՙilis in Iran, 
Syria, and Tajikistan – especially when compared with the religious majority – 
were particularly susceptible to internalizing this motif of secularity and, de-
spite changes in the past few decades, maintaining it. This can be explained by 
several factors. First, as in many countries, official secularism does not pre-
clude the state from sponsoring and giving privileges to certain religions in the 
public sphere in order to benefit from their symbolic significance and exercise 
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measures of control over them.20 This was the case with the Sunnis (and to a 
lesser extent Christianity) in Syria and the Twelver Shiʻis in Iran. Even in So-
viet Tajikistan, the religion of the majority, Sunni Islam, received some official 
recognition and patronage.21 Ismaՙilism, on the other hand, as a heterodox reli-
gious minority did not receive any such official recognition and patronage, 
effectively limiting it to the private sphere. This was further strengthened by 
the practice of taqiyya (religious dissimulation), which entails that individual 
Ismaՙilis maintain a strict separation between a private sphere, where they can 
express and practice their religion, and a public sphere, where they hide it (in 
order to conform to the principle of a secular public sphere and/or avoid un-
wanted attention to their different religious beliefs). Also, many Ismaՙilis saw in 
secularism an ideology that could unify them with the rest of society and inte-
grate them into something larger than their small communities.  
5. Khoja Ismaՙili Communities in East Africa 
5.1 Origins and Early History of the Khoja 
The origins of the Khoja can be traced to several Hindu sub-castes that over 
several centuries migrated down the Indus river valley and by the 18th century 
had settled in the Sindh-Gujarat corridor. Over the course of their centuries-
long migration, they changed their main economic activity from agriculture to 
trade after absorbing members of the mercantile Lohana and Bhatiya sub-castes 
(Akhtar 2016, 33-5). Furthermore, they developed a syncretic religious tradi-
tion known as Satpanth (Sanskrit for “true path”), which was an amalgamation 
of Hindu and Islamic (including Ismaՙili) elements.22 At the turn of the 19th 
century, an affluent Khoja community emerged in Bombay – a metropolitan 
city and a major trading port at the Indian Ocean – whose members worked in 
international trade. Although they acknowledged some form of allegiance to 
                                                             
20  Perhaps, the best example of this model of secularism is Kemalist Turkey; see Dressler 
(2011).  
21  The Soviets established the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Central Asia and 
Kazakhstan (Russian acronym: SADUM). It was usually chaired by a senior Naqshbandi lead-
er and worked to oversee mosques, appoint religious officials, issue fatwas, and organize 
pilgrimage to Mecca. Under SADUM, a number of Islamic schools and institutes were 
opened and maintained, such as the Imam al-Bukhari Institute in Tashkent, which was es-
tablished in 1971 (Epkenhans 2016, 182). 
22  There is another view within scholarship on the origins of the Khoja, which states that the 
Khoja were Hindus converted by Isma ՙili missionaries sent from Persia during the 14th and 
15th centuries. According to this view, which is more consistent with the contemporary offi-
cial Isma ՙili narrative, these missionaries used Hindu motifs and symbolism to communicate 
Isma ՙili religious ideas to the local population and dissimulate their message from persecution.  
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Ismaՙili Imams in Persia, which included sending alms and performing pilgrim-
age, they did not simply identify as Isma ՙilis, Hindus (itself a modern religious 
category), or Muslims either. However, after the Ismaՙili Imam Aga Khan I (r. 
1817-1881) fled from Iran and arrived in Bombay in 1848, conflicts erupted 
between him and some leaders of the prosperous Khoja community in the city, 
which revolved around the right to determine certain traditions (such as rules of 
inheritance), the appointment of officials, and the management of the commu-
nity’s sizable properties and financial resources. These conflicts resulted in a 
series of legal battles in British-Indian courts, the most famous of which is the 
so-called Aga Khan Case of 1866, in which British judge Sir Joseph Arnould 
ruled that the Khoja were essentially Isma ՙilis of Hindu origins, confirming 
thereby Aga Khan I’s spiritual and temporal authority over their community.23 
Resistance to the authority of the Isma ՙili Imams, however, continued among 
the Khoja until the beginning of the 20th century, which resulted in the com-
munity eventually splitting into three groups: Ismaՙili (the majority), Twelver 
Shiʻi, and a small Sunni community.24  
In response to these continuous disputes and schisms, the Aga Khans initiat-
ed a series of organizational, doctrinal, and ritual reforms that aimed at assert-
ing their direct and absolute authority over the Khoja Ismaՙili community and 
delineating its boundaries against other religious groups. The reforms situated 
the Khoja clearly within the fold of Islam, but distinct from Sunnis and 
Twelver Shiʻis, by gradually removing manifest Hindu elements and asserting 
an Islamic-Shiʻi-Ismaՙili identity (Boivin 1994, 197-8), which entailed transpos-
ing Khoja religious traditions from an “Indic” religious form (panth25) into a 
“Middle-Eastern” one (dīn). Nevertheless, as Iqbal Akhtar suggests, this did 
not mean that one religious form had simply replaced the other (2016, 44, 183), 
but that Isma ՙilism as a religious identity was layered over the Khoja caste 
social structure and cultural forms, resulting in a community that was defined 
by a Muslim faith yet retaining many of the social, religious, and cultural char-
acteristics of its caste origins.  
                                                             
23  For an analysis of the Aga Khan Case and the arguments of the involved parties, see Purohit 
(2012, 35-56). 
24  Unless otherwise stated, the term Khoja in this article refers to Khoja Ismaՙilis or to the 
Khoja in general before schisms in the modern era. The term is used in English-speaking 
contexts both as a noun – to describe an individual member or the collective – and as an 
adjective. For a discussion of its etymology and an overview of the early history of the Khoja 
and their schisms, see Akhtar (2016, 33-47).  
25  The term panth refers to several South Asian religious groups that emerged in the late 
medieval and early modern period, which include the Satpanth (the pre-modern Khoja reli-
gious tradition). Some of the main characteristics of panthic religious traditions are affinity 
toward Bhaktism (Hindu devotional traditions), a vernacular literature (usually in the form 
of devotional songs), and an emphasis on performative aspects (Purohit 2012, 10). 
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The contrast between dīn and panth in terms of reification may shed some 
light on why Ismaՙilis from the Middle East as opposed to South Asian Ismaՙilis 
differ in the extent to which they are disposed to distinguish religion from its 
social and cultural context.26 Ismaՙilism, as it developed in the Middle East 
during the Middle Ages, with its universalism, strong missionary character, 
theocratic aspirations, and rich theological tradition, is far more reified as an 
exclusive system of beliefs, laws, and practices (dīn in the Islamic sense of the 
term) compared with a panthic religion, such as that of the pre-modern Khoja, 
which is effectively inseparable from the caste as a social and cultural struc-
ture. Arguably, Ismaՙilis that grow up in countries such as Syria and Iran have a 
more reified understanding of religion in comparison with Khoja Isma ՙilis 
whose religion, as mentioned above, still retains many panthic features, even 
though their legal and normative definition as a branch of Shiʻi Islam (i.e., a 
dīn) was already established in the early modern period. In fact, the process of 
transforming the Khoja religious traditions into dīn is still underway, which can 
be observed in the efforts of Aga Khan IV to reform the Khoja religious tradi-
tions and their self-understanding, especially through the Institute of Isma’ili 
Studies and its religious education programs.27  
5.1 Settlement and Social Organization in East Africa 
Over the course of the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries, many Kho-
jas, along with members of several other South Asian mercantile communities 
(which included Hindus, Parsis, and Bohras among others), migrated from 
South Asia to several regions around the Indian Ocean, such as East Africa, 
South Arabia, and Southeast Asia. Their commercial skills were valued by 
colonial powers and some local rulers, who encouraged their migration in order 
to support economic development and help integrate local markets into an 
expanding transregional capitalist economy. Under colonial rule in East Afri-
ca28, Khoja Ismaՙilis were part of a hierarchical system of autonomous ethno-
                                                             
26  Wilfred C. Smith points out that religious traditions differ in the extent to which each 
presents itself as a reified systematized entity, and that of “world religions” Islam has been 
the one with the strongest tendency toward reification (1964, 75-81). This may not apply to 
Islam everywhere and in every time, but in the context of the Middle East and a self-
conscious religious movement such as Ismaՙilism, it might very well be the case.  
27  For studies on the efforts made by Isma ՙili Imams and institutions toward the “Islamization” 
(or what one may as well call dinization) of the Khoja, see Kassam (1995, 9-26); Boivin 
(2010); Purohit (2012, 111-32). For a comparable case, see Dressler’s study of the conceptu-
alization of Alevism in early Turkish-nationalist historiography as an Islamic, albeit “hetero-
dox,” religious group – a process he describes as religionization (2013, 1-23).  
28  Isma ՙili communities have existed in East African territories under British, French, Portu-
guese, and German colonial rule, which include modern-day Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Mad-
agascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Burundi. There have also been communities in some 
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religious communities, with white Europeans at the top; South Asians in the 
middle, working in trade and local administration; and black Africans at the 
bottom, undertaking manual labor. Within this communalist system of social 
organization, Khoja Ismaՙili communities prospered benefitting from their prox-
imity to Europeans by acquiring modern education and administrative skills. 
However, during decolonization in the second half of the 20th century, many 
Khojas left, or were forced to leave, East Africa for Western Europe (mostly 
Britain, France, and Portugal) and North America because of racial and eco-
nomic tensions with the black African majority. Relying on their modern edu-
cation and entrepreneurial skills, East African Khoja Isma ՙilis were able to 
prosper again in the West and establish successful communities with extensive 
financial resources. 
Aga Khan III introduced organizational and ideological reforms to modern-
ize and assert his authority over Khoja Ismaՙili communities in East Africa. 
These reforms became the basis of the contemporary transnational Isma ՙili 
community and its institutions. Starting in 1905, he issued a series of booklets 
titled “Rules and Regulations” for his jamats29 in different countries to govern 
their internal affairs, which included detailed rules regarding administrative 
institutions, the appointment and mandates of officials, the management of 
financial resources and communal properties, personal law, welfare, member-
ship, and different aspects of worship. Starting from 1946, these documents 
became known as Constitutions, which indicates the self-perception of the 
community as a self-governing corporate body (Hirji 2011, 146-7). Khoja 
communities in East Africa were accordingly organized in an elaborate net-
work of administrative bodies (called Councils) operating on provincial, na-
tional, and transnational levels. They represented a comprehensive system of 
governance and welfare that included hospitals, schools, charities, clubs, and 
even gated residential estates. In matters of personal law, there were communal 
institutions (tribunals or arbitration boards) that resolved disputes internally 
without resorting to state courts. This corporate system of communal organiza-
tion became the model for Ismaՙili communities worldwide and was gradually 
extended to other countries.30 However, the extent of its application varied 
depending on various factors, such as political context and the wealth of the 
community. Thus, in countries such as Syria, Iran, and Tajikistan, Councils are 
                                                                                                                                
central and southern Africa countries, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and South 
Africa. 
29  Jamat or jamath (pronounced jamat, from Arabic jamaʻah, meaning “group”) is a term that 
was used by the Khoja to refer to the congregation of adult males in a particular locality 
(hence jamatkhana, i.e., the hall where they meet), before being adopted by the Aga Khans 
to refer to Ismaՙilis residing in a certain region or town. The adjective jamati (or jamathi) 
could be translated as “communal” or “denominational.” 
30  In 1986, Aga Khan IV issued a universal Constitution for Ismaՙili communities around the 
world to homogenize their administrative systems. 
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far more limited in their scope and capacities than those in Khoja communities 
in East Africa and South Asia and, beyond worship and basic religious educa-
tion, they offer little in terms of social and economic services. 
The Councils are highly bureaucratic administrative institutions in the We-
berian sense of the term (Weber 1978, 217-26). They are run according to 
written, abstract rules (the Constitutions), to which all members and officials 
are subject, with obedience due not to the person in a position of authority, but 
to the “impersonal order” represented by these rules. Furthermore, officials are 
organized according to a clear hierarchy with explicitly defined appointments, 
terms, mandates, and jurisdictions. These Councils are also highly differentiat-
ed into specialized committees and boards, most of which are concerned with 
social, cultural, and economic issues, such as health, education, economic 
planning, law, and women’s affairs. The staff of all these administrations are 
lay individuals with no specific religious training or ordination required. Even 
when it comes to some typical clerical functions (such as conducting religious 
services), they are carried out by lay officials appointed by the Aga Khan for 
limited terms.31 There is no lifelong ministry in contemporary Ismaՙilism and 
clergy in any meaningful sense of the term has been abolished and replaced 
with lay bureaucracy. 
Another feature of this system of administration is its business-like charac-
ter. Many rules and regulations in the Constitutions, including those related to 
rituals and religious ceremonies, are associated with the payment of a sum of 
money, such as a fee, deposit, or fine. The Constitution issued in 1946 for East 
African Ismaՙilis,32 for example, prescribes monthly dues33 (Constitution 1946, 
ch. VI, section 16); admission fees for filing a case, which increase depending 
on the number of defendants and witnesses (ibid., ch. V, sections 1, 4, 7); fees 
for registering birth (ibid., ch. IX, section 1); a permission fee to be buried in 
                                                             
31  Every Isma ՙili jamatkhana has two officials: a mukhi (chief, from Sanskrit mukhiya) and a 
kamadia (treasurer) who, along with conducting rituals, are responsible for collecting differ-
ent types of dues and tithes during daily rituals and other religious ceremonies. Previously 
(among the Khoja), people occupying these posts were elected from among the wealthiest 
members of the congregation before the Aga Khans established their right to appoint them 
directly. For non-Khoja Ismaՙili communities, there were local priests (known as shaykhs in 
Syria; khalifas and pirs in Tajikistan) who were responsible for conducting religious services 
and transmitting religious knowledge. They usually ran in certain families, but the Aga 
Khans have gradually replaced them with directly appointed mukhis and kamadias.  
32  The document is titled The Constitution, Rules and Regulations of His Highness The Aga 
Khan Ismailia Councils of Africa and was issued by His Highness The Aga Khan Ismaili Su-
preme Council for Africa. Henceforth, it is referred to in citations as “Constitution 1946.”  
33  A regular contribution of one shilling per month entitles a member of the community to 
receive a letter confirming his membership, which is necessary to receive assistance from 
Isma ՙili Councils when traveling abroad. The booklet Rules and Regulations issued in 1914 by 
The Khoja Shia Imami Ismaili Council Rangoon (in modern-day Burma) speaks of “Jamat 
Taxes” (Rules and Regulations 1914, ch. II, section 17). 
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an Isma ՙili cemetery (ibid., ch. IX, sections 30-31); and a fine of one shilling per 
minute for arriving more than ten minutes late to a marriage ceremony (ibid., 
ch. IX, section 10). Also, to join the community, one is required to submit an 
application and in certain cases to make a deposit (ibid., ch. VII, sections 13, 
15). Similarly, to leave the community one must give written notice in advance 
and complete “prescribed forms” (ibid., ch. VII, section 3a). Owing outstand-
ing sums of money to the Council can have grave consequences for an individ-
ual member and his family, which include, according to the booklet of “Rules 
and Regulations” issued in 1914 for Isma ՙilis in Rangoon, halting a marriage or 
death ceremony midway through (Rules and Regulations 1914, ch. II, section 
17).  
This highly fiscal nature of Khoja Isma ՙili communities is reflected not only 
in their organization, but also in their ideological and economic values. Aga 
Khan III and his successor attempted to shift the economic and work ethics of 
Khoja Isma ՙilis from traditional commerce to rational capitalism, entrepreneuri-
alism, and corporate enterprise.34 They brought Western economic consultants 
to advise their followers and established a number of capitalist economic ven-
tures, including an insurance company (Jubilee Insurance Group) and an in-
vestment trust (Diamond Jubilee Investment Trust, now called Diamond Trust 
Bank). The Constitution of 1946 encourages Ismaՙilis to “exercise the strictest 
economy in daily life” (Constitution 1946, ch. VII, sections 1-2) and to avoid 
extravagant spending on occasions such as marriage and betrothal ceremonies. 
Aga Khan III also instilled in his followers a Protestant-like sacralized notion 
of work – whether to earn income, as service to the community, or as charity 
for outsiders (Boivin 1994, 206-13).  
This emphasis on economic values and worldly orientation is paralleled with 
a declining emphasis on theological thought within contemporary Ismaՙilism. 
While Aga Khan III used some classical Isma ՙili notions like the distinction 
between ẓahir (outer, exoteric) and baṭin (inner, esoteric) to justify his modern-
ization reforms, he reoriented the latter toward worldly issues and personal 
well-being instead of gnostic mysteries or spiritual truths as in traditional Is-
maՙili theology (Ruthven 1997, 382-84). The focus in his edicts, guidance, and 
institutional endeavors was generally on socio-economic development, com-
munal service, ethics, education, health, and personal well-being rather than 
doctrinal and liturgical issues, which have been relegated to the background.35 
This is reflected in the Constitution of 1946, which contains hardly any refer-
ence to specific creeds and doctrines.36 It seems that the most important con-
                                                             
34  For an analysis of the economic ethics of Khoja Ismaՙilis in East Africa, see Bocock (1971).  
35  Aga Khan III states in his Memoirs that “[m]uch of the work of the Ismaili councils and of 
the Imam’s representatives nowadays is purely social” (1954, 185, emphasis added). 
36 This changed in the following decades under the Imamate of Aga Khan IV. The universal 
Constitution of 1986 declares in its preamble the adherence of Nizari Ismaՙilis to the basic 
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cern of this document is not faith per se, but total submission to the authority of 
the Aga Khan and his institutions along with the fulfilment of fiscal obliga-
tions. The only specific reference to a creed in this Constitution is an article 
stating that the “ancient words [sic] ‘LA-ILAHA-ILLAL-LAH MA-
HOMEDUR-RASULULLAH’” (i.e., the Islamic shahada) are to be “recited 
publicly in all our Ismaՙilia Jamaths” (Constitution 1946, ch. VI, section 14). 
Also in terms of rituals, the Constitutions speak only of some technical aspects, 
such as when and where to perform them, what to pay, and what food to 
bring.37  
This corporate, comprehensive system of governance along with the coloni-
al communalist policies of segregated self-governing ethno-religious communi-
ties meant that Khoja communities have been largely independent of the state 
institutionally as well as ideologically. The migration of the Khoja from South 
Asia took place long before the establishment of any nation state in the Sub-
continent. In colonial and post-colonial East Africa, they were never integrated 
into a nationalist project of state-building comparable to those implemented in 
Syria, Iran, or Soviet Tajikistan.38 Their trading networks were not limited to 
the boundaries of national economies, and they frequently migrated to coun-
tries that offered them a liberal economic environment. Wherever they settled, 
Khoja communities remained relatively autonomous. As many scholars have 
noted, for the Khoja, membership in the community is the primary marker of 
social identity, and social participation takes place largely inside the local 
community or transnationally between different Ismaՙili communities, not on a 
national cross-confessional level. Some even suggest that the Khoja should be 
regarded as a de-territorialized nation with its own form of transnational reli-
gious or communal “citizenship” (Akhtar 2016, 67-83; Kadende-Kaiser and 
Kaiser 1998). If the nation state, to take the words of Ira Lapidus, is a “home-
land of the mind,” (1992, 22), a Khoja Isma ՙili often knows no “homeland” of 
                                                                                                                                
tenets of Islam (such as the shahada, finality of Mohammad’s prophethood, and divinity of 
the Qur’an) and the Shiʻi doctrine of Imamate (Aga Khan IV 1986, sections A and B).  
37  Such highly fiscal and bureaucratic rules have attracted criticisms from outsiders that the 
Aga Khans have turned Khoja Isma ՙili communities into revenue-generating machines, but 
some reason that such revenues are re-invested for the welfare of the community and for 
charitable work (Schacht 1965, 127-8). Even from within the community, some individuals 
have voiced criticism regarding this aspect. For example, Faisal Devji, who is one of the very 
few publicly critical voices within the community, warns that Ismaՙilism has lost its sub-
stance as a form of religious thought and has become effectively an “NGO” with “a secular 
cult of personality” (2014, 54-5). Another example is Daryoush Poor, who is clearly positive 
in his view of the Aga Khans, yet he too warns of the “iron cage” effect (à la Weber) of hav-
ing the community managed by a bureaucracy with no religious or intellectual credentials 
(2014, 218).  
38  Even when a nationalist project of social and economic integration was implemented, as in 
the case of Tanzania under President Nyerere (r. 1964-1985), most Khoja Ismaՙilis resisted it 
(Bocock 1971, 374-76). 
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the mind; or, to be more accurate, their “homeland of the mind” is the Khoja 
transnational community, and not the nation states39 under which they may 
happen to live. Hence, Khoja Ismaՙilis of East African origins rarely develop a 
strong sense of territorial or nationalist identity (Akhtar 2016, 63-6), compared 
with Syrian, Iranian, or Tajik Ismaՙilis. 
5.2 Conceptual Distinctions between Religion and other Social 
Spheres 
Theoretically, Ismaՙilism knows no distinction between religious or clerical 
authority on the one hand, and temporal or lay authority on the other. Both 
authorities are united in the figure of the Imam who, according to Shiʻi beliefs, 
is the legitimate leader of the community of believers and the inheritor of the 
Prophet’s political as well as religious authority. It is within Sunni Islam that a 
differentiation has evolved over several centuries between the authority of the 
sultan (or in some cases the caliph), which was of a more temporal nature, and 
that of the ulama, who had the authority to interpret religious texts and issue 
religious decrees. For classical Ismaՙilism, the ideal form of government is a 
theocracy, where the Imam is simultaneously the religious and the temporal 
ruler; a situation which was historically realized during the Fatimid Caliphate 
(909-1171). In fact, the idea of re-establishing an Ismaՙili state was entertained 
as recently as the 1930s when Aga Khan III approached the government of 
British India requesting to be granted a princely state, where Isma ՙilis “could 
practice all their customs, establish their own laws, and (on the material side) 
build up their own financial center” (Aga Khan III 1954, 285-6). Yet even 
though he acknowledged the theocratic nature of authority in Ismaՙilism and his 
recent territorial claims, Aga Khan III ultimately surrenders, in his Memoirs, 
any claims to political authority or allegiance. Instead, he urges his Ismaՙili 
followers to be loyal citizens in their respective countries, regardless of the 
form of the state, and asks them to “render unto God the things which are 
God’s and to Caesar those which are Caesar’s” (ibid., 187).  
Aga Khan III thereby limited his claims to the religious and, insofar as that 
does not contradict the laws of the land in which an Isma ՙili community exists, 
social realms (ibid., 187-91). In fact, one can distinguish between three spheres 
of activity in relation to religion in the thought of Aga Khan III and the institu-
tions he created: secular/political; jamati (pertaining to Ismaՙilis as a corporate 
community); and religious (related to worship and beliefs). However, from a 
practical perspective, especially when looking at the Constitutions and the 
reality of Ismaՙili communities in East Africa as explained above, the scope of 
what is meant by jamati is quite extensive; it effectively comprises everything 
                                                             
39  Dual or even triple citizenships are not uncommon among Khoja Isma ՙilis of East Africa or 
East African origins.  
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except agencies of physical coercion. In other words, in Khoja Isma ՙili commu-
nities, social, legal, and economic matters fall under the authority or at least the 
influence of the Imam. For example, even though the rules contained in the 
Constitutions do not override the laws of the country, they outline mechanisms 
and urge Ismaՙilis to resolve their legal disputes internally through community 
institutions (see, for example, Constitution 1946, ch. V, sections 9-10). This is 
confirmed by Joseph Schacht in his study of Islam in East Africa, in which he 
mentions that Khoja Ismaՙilis “always settle their cases out of court” (1965, 
100). It should be mentioned here that exercising such an extensive scope of 
authority for a non-state agency or institution is possible only in a national 
context that is governed by communalism, as in colonial East Africa. This was 
not possible in countries such as Iran, Syria, and Tajikistan, where state institu-
tions sought to integrate different communities economically, socially, and 
culturally into a unified national whole.  
Another important point to note here is that while the term jamati implies 
that many social spheres of activity were overseen by institutions of the Ismaՙili 
community in East Africa, which is of course a community defined by religion, 
this does not mean that these spheres are organized and operated by religious 
rules. As mentioned above, Ismaՙili Constitutions rarely contain references to 
specific creeds or religious principles other than the absolute authority of the 
Imam and they are generally of a technical-bureaucratic nature. For example, in 
matters of law, such as the rules and regulations for the procedure of cases 
(Constitution 1946, ch. V) or family law (ibid., ch. IX), there are hardly any 
references to the Qur’an, traditions from the Prophet or previous Imams, writ-
ings of famous Ismaՙili missionaries, or any other possible authoritative source 
of law. The tribunals and arbitration boards instituted by these Constitutions are 
not staffed by specialists in Isma ՙili law40, but by lay individuals who may have 
knowledge of local laws (such as lawyers) or experience in mediating and 
resolving disputes within the local community (such as elders).41 This applies 
effectively to all committees, boards, and societies operating within the frame-
work of Ismaՙili Councils, except for the Ismailia Association (now called the 
Tariqah and Religious Education Board), which is responsible for religious 
services and religious education. The fact that an institution of a religious 
community oversees a specific sphere of activity within this community does 
not necessarily imply that it operates according to a religious logic.  
                                                             
40  Isma ՙilis developed their own version of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), which was achieved by 
renowned Fatimid jurist al-Qadi al-Nuʿman (d. 974) in his legal compendium Daʿaʾim al-
Islam (Pillars of Islam). While this book is still the primary authoritative source for legal and 
ritual practices of Mustaʿli Ismaʿilis, its importance for Nizari Isma ՙilis remains largely sym-
bolic as part of their heritage, but it does not serve as an authoritative source for their laws.  
41  For an overview of the development of Ismaՙili law in pre-modern and contemporary times, 
see Jamal (2000; 2013). 
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5.3 Secularity in Khoja Ismaՙili Communities in East Africa: A Case 
of Internal Secularization 
While Ismaՙili communities in Syria, Tajikistan, and Iran have each internalized 
motifs of secularity from their respective national contexts, it would be difficult 
to derive or reduce secularity in each Khoja community in East Africa (meso-
level) to secularity in its respective country (macro-level). First, Khoja com-
munities show stark similarities despite their distribution over many countries 
with diverse cultures, political systems, and colonial histories. They were at 
any rate organized on a transnational level, with institutions in different coun-
tries operating within the framework of “His Highness The Aga Khan Ismaili 
Supreme Council for Africa” and governed by the same Constitution (1946). 
Second, even if we were to generalize a common motif of secularity for all East 
African countries, such as secularity for the sake of balancing/accommodating 
diversity, which at first glance seems to be consistent with the colonialist policy 
of allowing South Asian ethno-religious communities a great margin of auton-
omy, this would not explain why and how secularity among Ismaՙili Khoja 
communities is different from that, say, in the closely-related Bohra communi-
ty.42 A religious policy that is based on the principle of balancing diversity may 
allow a high degree of confluence between the religious and the secular within 
religious communities because of the extensive autonomy they enjoy in manag-
ing their social, cultural, and economic affairs, but it does not explain the spe-
cific form of secularity that becomes dominant in each community. Therefore, I 
intend to employ an additional conceptual tool, namely internal secularization, 
to examine the work of secularity at the meso-level. 
Many of the above-mentioned characteristics of Khoja Ismaՙili communities 
in East Africa (bureaucratization along business-like rational lines, high func-
tional differentiation of religious institutions, lay staff, worldly orientation, 
capitalist ethics, and decline of traditional theology) are consistent with internal 
secularization as described by Luckmann, Berger, Dobbelaere, and Chaves. 
These similarities notwithstanding, Khoja Isma ՙili communities are not internal-
ly secularized in the same way as American Protestant denominations, which 
form the “prototype” for the concept of internal secularization. In fact, one can 
distinguish here between two models of internal secularization: adaptive (as 
described by Luckmann, Berger, and Dobbelaere) and top-down (as in the case 
                                                             
42  The Bohras are a Gujarati trading community that follows the Mustaʿli branch of Ismaՙilism 
and shares with the Khoja many cultural and social characteristics, yet there are marked 
differences when it comes to the question of religion and secularity. There is, on the one 
hand, a conservative clergy that keeps strongly to traditional Ismaՙili theology and rituals 
and, on the other hand, a vocal oppositional faction (known as the “Progressives”) that de-
mands restriction of the power of the clergy and greater individual social and religious 
freedom (Amiji 1975). 
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of Khoja Isma ՙilis). For one thing, internal secularization in Khoja Ismaՙili 
communities did not develop in secular, pluralistic societies and hence it cannot 
be described as an adaptation to such a context. Rather, it was initiated top-
down by the supreme religious leader, Aga Khan III, in response to continuous 
challenges to his authority from within Khoja communities. He sought to cen-
tralize religious authority and institutions in order to exercise direct and exclu-
sive control over all religious, social, and administrative aspects within these 
communities. Bureaucratization and de-laicization enabled him to concentrate 
religious authority in his figure alone and to abolish any form of independent 
religious authority (charismatic or traditional). Furthermore, by de-emphasizing 
traditional Ismaՙili theology – effectively reducing it to unconditional obedience 
to his authority – he decreased the possibility for individuals to act as inde-
pendent mediators, interpreters, or transmitters of religious knowledge.43  
A second important difference between the two cases of internal seculariza-
tion (the United States vis-à-vis East Africa) is their scope. By definition, in-
ternal secularization occurs within religious communities and their institutions; 
hence, how far processes of internal secularization may reach depends on the 
social role of religion in each context, which is in turn determined by the extent 
of secularization in the society in question. American society is highly secular-
ized in terms of functional differentiation, even though religion continues to be 
relatively visible in the public sphere. Law, economy, education, and other 
social spheres are run by the state or the private sector, with limited influence 
by religious organizations. Additionally, on an individual level, the American 
religious market is quite open, with individuals having a wide margin of free-
dom to choose their denomination.44 These factors restrict the influence of 
religious institutions in the United States on the affairs of the members of their 
communities, thereby limiting the extent to which internal secularization may 
unfold in this context.  
The situation in colonial or even postcolonial East Africa, especially among 
South Asian communities, where most social, economic, and legal aspects have 
been undertaken within the framework of the religious community and its 
institutions, is rather different. These societies are arguably less secularized (in 
terms of functional differentiation) than the United States. Furthermore, ethnic-
                                                             
43  Even if we compare it with the approach of Chaves, which is different than Luckmann, 
Berger, and Dobbelaere’s adaptive model, internal secularization in Khoja Isma ՙili communi-
ties was not the outcome of a struggle between a lay and a clerical structure in religious 
institutions. 
44  Most sociologists of religion agree on the liberal character of the American religious market, 
but disagree on its implications for religious involvement. The thesis advanced by advocates 
of the “religious market theory” (also called “rational-choice theory”), such as Rodney Stark, 
that deregulation explains the vitality of religion in the United States compared with West-
ern Europe, has come into question in the past few years. For an overview of this discussion, 
see Aarts et al. (2010).  
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ity and religion in this case are deeply entwined with each other; that is, reli-
gion is defined by birth and abandoning one’s religion entails severing family 
and community ties, which enables religious leadership to exercise extensive 
control over the social and economic affairs of their communities. One may 
thus argue that within a context like the East African one, in which religious 
institutions carry a variety of social functions, the processes of internal secular-
ization (such as bureaucratization, internal differentiation, laicization, and 
reorientation toward capitalism) can go to far greater lengths than within a 
secularized society like the United States.  
6. Conclusion 
Khoja Isma ՙilis, especially in East Africa, have lived in autonomous communi-
ties that are governed by a semi-comprehensive bureaucratic system. The life 
of an individual Khoja can be engulfed to a great extent by his or her religious 
community with relatively little dependence on or interaction with institutions 
of the state, or members of other religious communities. The housing estate 
where one lives; the school to which one goes; the hospital where one is treat-
ed; the business one runs; and the legal institution that solves one’s disputes 
with fellow Ismaՙilis can all be tied to the institutions of the community without 
ever having to resort to the state. Yet this does not mean that the life of a Khoja 
person is necessarily filled with the sacred or that everything he or she does is 
justified theologically in reference to religious texts, traditions, and practices. 
On the contrary, most of these affairs are run according to a rational, pragmatic 
logic. Even though this type of community is based on a religious principle – 
namely, the absolute authority of the Imam – this authority itself is oriented 
toward achieving worldly goals such as better education, health, and economic 
efficiency.  
Within this internally secularized religious system, it makes less sense for 
the Khoja to draw binary distinctions between a religious sphere and another 
that is secular. Distinctions are rather made in accordance with a tripartite 
system of classification (secular, jamati, religious) with the second sphere 
extensively defined and supported by elaborate bureaucratic institutions. Fur-
thermore, the jamati sphere is not limited by the boundaries of the nation state; 
it extends beyond by means of a transnational institutional and cultural frame-
work. This constellation of religious, social, and institutional factors produces 
specific dispositions and tendencies to draw, maintain, and negotiate the 
boundaries of religion in relation to other spheres. These dispositions and 
tendencies become embedded in the lifeworld of Khoja Ismaՙilis, resulting in a 
specific culture of secularity that informs how they conceive religion and its 
relevance for their everyday life. In this culture of secularity, religion serves as 
the overall umbrella under which most spheres of social life are organized, yet 
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the internal logics and rationalities of these individual spheres are largely au-
tonomous and independent of any specific religious imperatives. This culture 
of secularity is markedly different than those of Ismaՙilis from Syria, Tajikistan, 
and Iran, which have developed within the physical and ideological boundaries 
of the nation state. Accordingly, the latter cases are dominated by a binary 
distinction between a secular, nationally defined sphere that includes most 
aspects of social life, and a religious one that is limited to cultic aspects, with 
the boundaries between these two spheres fairly clearly demarcated. The con-
trast between these two cultures of secularity becomes evident in social interac-
tions between members of different Isma ՙili communities on a transnational 
level.  
On a general theoretical level, this comparative study of the global Ismaՙili 
community shows that secularity within a religious community is not necessari-
ly a reflection, internalization, or even rejection of the dominant motifs of 
secularity in its national context. Secularity as forms and arrangements of dif-
ferentiation between religion and other social spheres is also shaped by the 
organizational and religious particularities of each community and by its con-
nections with institutional and cultural formations beyond the nation state. In 
order to shed light on these dimensions of secularity, the inclusion of the con-
cept of internal secularization within the multiple secularities framework, as the 
analysis above has shown, can be fruitful. Furthermore, this article suggests 
that there is a relationship between different types of secularity on the macro- 
and meso-levels and different ways for individuals to draw boundaries between 
religion and other spheres in everyday life. This relationship could be articulat-
ed through the concept of cultures of secularity, which highlights that certain 
patterns of behavior, dispositions, and conceptual distinctions, produced and 
sustained by institutional, legal, and ideological structures, become embedded 
in the social milieu of the individual and exercise considerable influence on 
their thinking and behavior. This is not to deny individual agency and the influ-
ence of biographies in shaping unique views on the question of religion and 
secularity, but structural elements undoubtedly have a tangible effect. 
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